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JURISDICTION OF THE APPELLATE COURT 
This is an appeal of the Order Granting Motion for Award of 
Attorney's Fees in favor of the Defendants/Appellees, Salt Lake 
City Knee & Sports Medicine, Lonnie E. Paulos, M.D., P.C., and 
Thomas D. Rosenberg, M.D., P.C. The action involved a dispute 
between the parties as to their respective rights and status under 
the Termination and Purchase Agreement entered into between them. 
The Order was entered by the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson in the 
Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah. This Court has jurisdiction of this Appeal pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (j) (1992). Originally, the Utah Supreme 
Court had jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) 
(1992) as the Court of Appeals does not have original appellate 
jurisdiction. However, pursuant to Notice dated April 26, 1995, 
the Utah Supreme Court transferred this case to the Utah Court of 
Appeals for disposition. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Based upon the language of the Termination Agreement and 
Purchase Agreement, did the trial court err as a matter of law in 
awarding the Appellees their costs and attorney's fees incurred in 
defending the Plaintiff/Appellant Salt Lake Knee and Sports 
Rehabilitation's Complaint for Declaratory Relief? 
Because the attorney's fees were awarded based upon the 
court's interpretation of the contract language, the issue is a 
question of law on which this Court need not defer to the trial 
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court's construction. Instead, this Court is free to render its 
independent interpretation. (See Faulkner v. Farnsworth 714 P.2d 
1149 (Utah 1986).) 
2. Did the trial court err in applying the provisions of 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56.5 (1992) to the facts of this case, 
resulting in an award to Appellees of their attorney's fees and 
costs incurred in defending this action? 
The interpretation of statute is a question of law which this 
court reviews for correctness and accords the trial court's 
decision no particular deference. (See Hercules, Inc. v. Utah 
State Tax Commission 877 P.2d 133 (Utah 1994).) 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
Faulkner v. Farnsworth 714 P.2d 1149 (Utah 1986). (A copy of 
this case is included in Addendum "A" to this brief.) 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56.5 
Attorney's Fees - Reciprocal Rights to Recover Attorney's 
Fees. 
A court may award costs and attorney's fees to 
either party that prevails in a civil action 
based upon any promissory note, written 
contract, or other writing executed after 
April 28, 1986, when the provisions the 
promissory note, written contract, or other 
writing allow at least one party to recover 
attorney's fees. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Appellant, Salt Lake Knee & Sports Rehabilitation, Inc., 
(hereinafter "Rehabilitation") filed its Complaint for Declaratory 
Relief on October 4, 1991 seeking a declaratory judgment that a 
2 
transaction by and between the Appellees and IHC Hospitals, Inc. 
(hereinafter referred to as "IHC") on or about May 24, 1990 
constituted a "sale" as that term is defined in the Termination 
Agreement and Purchase Agreement by and between the parties to this 
action (hereinafter referred to as the "Termination Agreement"). 
Pursuant to the Termination Agreement, if the transaction was in 
fact a "sale", Rehabilitation is entitled to payment from the 
Appellees in an amount equal to one-third of the purchase price 
attributable to the purchase of good will. (R. 2 - 29) 
Subsequently, the Appellees filed an Amended Answer and 
Counterclaim alleging that Rehabilitation breached certain non-
competition provisions of the Termination Agreement. The 
Counterclaim was later dismissed with prejudice by stipulation of 
the parties. (R. 143 - 165) The Order of Dismissal was entered by 
the court on February 16, 1994. (R. 411) 
The Appellees, Salt Lake Knee & Sports Medicine, Lonnie E. 
Paulos, M.D., P.C. and Thomas D. Rosenberg M.D., P.C. filed their 
Motion for Summary Judgment on or about June 15, 1993, alleging 
that Rehabilitation could not produce evidence sufficient to avoid 
dismissal of its claims on summary judgment. (R. 168 - 170 and 171 
- 196) Rehabilitation filed a Counter Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment arguing that the transaction between the Appellees and IHC 
on or about May 24, 1990 was in fact a "sale" as that term is 
defined in the Termination Agreement and that Rehabilitation was 
entitled to judgment against the Appellees in an amount to be 
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proven at trial representing one third of the purchase price 
attributable to the purchase of good will. (R. 199-225) 
At the initial hearing on the motions for summary judgment on 
September 24, 1993, the court expressed its opinion that the 
transaction between the Appellees and IHC was in fact a "sale" as 
that term is defined in the Termination Agreement, but the court 
reached this conclusion based on a completely different 
interpretation of the contract than the interpretation propounded 
by the parties. (R. 480-82) Therefore, the Appellees requested 
and received the opportunity to submit additional written arguments 
relating to the court's interpretation of the contract. (R. 482-84) 
The matter once again came on for hearing on November 15, 1993 
at which time the court reversed its original position and ruled 
that the transaction was in fact not a "sale" as contemplated by 
the Termination Agreement. Therefore, the court granted the 
Appellees' Motion for Summary Judgment and dismissed 
Rehabilitation's Complaint with prejudice. (R. 494-95) 
As a result of what Rehabilitation believed was an error in 
law; the apparent inconsistencies in the positions taken by the 
court in each hearing; and based on what appeared to be an 
ambiguity in the contract itself resulting in the different 
interpretations, Rehabilitation filed a Motion for Reconsideration 
on or about November 29, 1993, and it came on regularly for hearing 
on January 28, 1994. (R. 351-53 and 361-96) The court 
reconsidered its decision but affirmed its previous ruling, and the 
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Order was entered on March 14, 1994. (R. 414-16) Rehabilitation 
filed its Notice of Appeal on or about April 11, 1994. (R. 417-18) 
This case is also before the Court of Appeals, as Case No. 
940417CA. It has been fully briefed by the parties and is waiting 
for oral argument. 
On or about April 19, 1994, the Appellees filed their Motion 
for Award of Attorney's Fees and Costs, basing the request on the 
language in the contract and Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56.5 (1992). 
(R. 422-424) Rehabilitation objected to the Motion on the basis 
that the Appellees were not entitled to their fees pursuant to the 
language of the contract and the fact that Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-
56.5 did not apply to the facts of this case. (R. 446-450) The 
Motion came on regularly for hearing on November 18, 1994, and the 
court granted the Appellees Motion on its merits by Minute Entry 
dated November 21, 1994, but found that the amount of attorney's 
fees requested was unreasonable. (R. 517) Thereafter, the parties 
stipulated that the Order could be entered in the amount of 
$10,415.87 without affecting Rehabilitation's right to appeal the 
liability issue. The Order was entered on January 23, 1995. (R. 
518-519) A timely Notice of Appeal was filed on February 7, 1995. 
(R. 522) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Prior to May 22, 1989, the parties to this action were 
working together to provide medical and physical therapy services 
at the Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center located at 670 East 3 900 
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South, Salt Lake City, Utah (hereinafter sometimes referred tc =is 
the "Center") pursuant to the terms of a Professional Serv s^ 
Contract and Lease Agreement entered into by the parties in 1987 
(hereinafter referred to as the "Professional Services Contract".) 
(R. 202, 234 and 238) 
2. At all times pertinent hereto, the Appellees, Salt Lake 
City Knee & Sports Medicine (hereinafter sometimes referred to as 
"Medicine") was a Utah general partnership and the Defendants, 
Lonnie E. Paulos, M.D., P.C., and Thomas D. Rosenberg, M.D., P.C., 
were the general partners of Salt Lake Knee & Sports Medicine 
(hereinafter sometimes referred to as "Paulos" and "Rosenburg".) 
(For brevity, when being referred to as a group, all defendants 
will be referred to as "Appellees".) (R. 202) 
3. Prior to termination of the Professional Services 
Contract, the parties to this action became involved in 
negotiations with IHC Hospitals, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as 
"IHC") for the purchase of the Center. Negotiations were also 
ongoing with HCA/St. Marks. (R. 202, 234 and 239) 
4. On or about January 19, 1989, Doug Toole, a principal of 
Rehabilitation, informed Rosenburg and Paulos that he and Greg 
Gardner, another principal of Rehabilitation, were not willing to 
terminate their business relationship with Holy Cross Hospital in 
order to work exclusively with IHC. Paulos left the room and 
returned with a Notice of Termination dated January 19, 1989, 
terminating the Professional Services Contract . (R. 203 and 23 9) 
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5. On or about May 22, 1989, the parties entered into a 
Termination Agreement and Purchase Agreement which terminated the 
Professional Services Contract (hereinafter "Termination 
Agreement"). Attorneys for Appellees drafted the Termination 
Agreement. (R. 203, 234-35, and 239-40) 
6. At issue in this case are paragraphs 11 and 14 of the 
Termination Agreement which state as follows: 
11. Purchase of Center. It is agreed that if 
within two (2) years from the date of this 
Agreement, Physicians [Appellees herein] sells 
the Center to any third party, Rehabilitation 
shall be entitled to one-third (1/3) of that 
portion of the purchase price which is 
attributed to good will. 'Sale' shall be 
defined as a transfer wherein the purchaser 
acquires and pays consideration for all of the 
following: The Center's lease on the Leased 
Premises, ownership of the name 'Salt Lake 
Sports Medicine Center,' all of the equipment 
and other assets located at the Center, the 
Center's patients and accounts receivable, and 
whereby the purchaser assumes complete 
operational control of the business of the 
Center and continues operating under the same 
name at the same location. 
14. Attorney's Fees. Should any party 
default in or breach any of the covenants or 
agreements contained herein, the defaulting or 
breaching party shall pay all costs and 
expenses, including reasonable attorney's 
fees, which may accrue from enforcing this 
agreement, or in pursuing any remedy provided 
hereunder, or by applicable law. (R. 423) 
(A copy of the Termination Agreement is attached hereto in Addendum 
"B" and is by reference made a part hereof.) (R. 8-15) (The 
Court's interpretation of paragraph 11 is involved in Case No. 
940417CA. As indicated above, it has been fully briefed and is 
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awaiting oral argument. This appeal deals specifically with the 
Court's order awarding Appellees their attorney's fees and costs 
pursuant to paragraph 14.) 
7. Approximately one year later, the Appellees entered into 
a series of agreements with IHC on May 24, 1990, for the purchase 
of an interest in the Center located at 670 East 3900 South as well 
as other Centers owned by Appellees located at 3 59 8th Avenue and 
the part-time clinic in Park City. (Copies of these agreements 
were submitted to the court for in camera review pursuant to a 
Stipulated Protective Order entered by the court. They remain 
sealed on appeal so precise citations to the record are not 
available.) These agreements included, but were not limited to, 
the following: 
a. The Appellees and IHC entered into an Asset Purchase 
Agreement whereby the Appellees purportedly sold to IHC an 
undivided one-half interest in all assets of the three 
facilities. The personal property sold is expressly defined 
in the Agreement and the description expressly includes "good 
will". (See % 1(a) of the Asset Purchase Agreement which was 
submitted for in camera review.) 
In addition to all of the personal property reflected 
above, the Appellees sold to IHC an undivided one-half 
interest in the leases pertaining to the three facilities at 
issue as well as Appellees' interest in material contracts. 
(See Us 1(b) and (c) of the Asset Purchase Agreement.) The 
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purchase price paid by IHC for purchase of this undivided one-
half interest was significant. (See 1 2 of the Asset Purchase 
Agreement.) 
b. Contemporaneously with the execution of the Asset 
Purchase Agreement, the Appellees executed a Special Warranty 
Bill of Sale and Assignment whereby Salt Lake City Knee & 
Sports Medicine transferred, assigned and conveyed to IHC the 
assets described above. It also expressly includes good will. 
(See the Special Warranty Bill of Sale and Assignment 
submitted for in camera review.) 
c. Contemporaneously with execution of the Asset 
Purchase Agreement, the Appellees and IHC hospitals entered 
into a Joint Venture Agreement for Sports Medicine West 
wherein each of the parties agreed to contribute to the newly 
created joint venture their 50% undivided interest in the 
"Assets pursuant to the Asset Purchase Agreement". [sic] The 
Joint Venture Agreement also states it was formed to "develop, 
construct, finance, own and manage the Building and to own, 
manage, market and operate the Businesses". (See f 2.3 of the 
Joint Venture Agreement submitted for in camera review.) The 
reference to the "building" refers to the plans by the joint 
venture to construct a new building wherein the business of 
the two Centers would be conducted. One of the "Businesses" 
was the Center at 3 900 South. Paragraph 9.3.1 of the Joint 
Venture Agreement expressly recognizes that it was formed to 
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take advantage of the unique reputations and abilities of 
Appellees Rosenberg and Paulos as orthopedic surgeons and that 
the joint venture was formed to enhance the development a :d 
preservation of the "good will" within the joint venture. 
(See f 9.3.1.) 
d. Contemporaneously with the execution of all of the 
foregoing, Appellees and IHC executed a Special Warranty Bill 
of Sale and Assignment whereby each transferred, assigned and 
conveyed to Sports Medicine West, their respective undivided 
one-half interests. It expressly lists "good will" as an 
asset being transferred. (See Special Warranty Bill of Sale 
and Assignment submitted for in camera review.) 
e. Similarly, assignments were executed by the parties 
transferring their interests in the leases and material 
contracts, first by and between Salt Lake City Knee & Sports 
Medicine to IHC Hospitals, Inc., and from Salt Lake City Knee 
& Sports Medicine and IHC Hospitals, Inc. to Sports Medicine 
West. (See documents submitted for in camera review.) 
f. Finally, the Appellees entered into a Management 
Agreement with the joint venture whereby they agreed to 
continue to conduct the businesses at two of the facilities 
until such time as the building to be built by the joint 
venture could be finished. (See documents submitted for in 
camera review.) 
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8. Subsequent to the execution of these documents, the joint 
venture continued to do business at the 3 900 South Center under the 
name "Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center". The name was not changed 
to "Sports Medicine West" until almost one and one-half years later 
and after Rehabilitation filed this law suit in October of 1991. 
(R. 235 and 241) 
9. After learning of the transaction between the Appellees 
and IHC, Rehabilitation requested information concerning it. The 
Appellees refused to provide such information on the basis that the 
transaction was not a "sale" as defined by the Termination 
Agreement. (R. 4) Therefore, on or about October 4, 1991, 
Rehabilitation filed its Complaint for declaratory judgment 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-33-1 (1992) seeking, among other 
things, an order declaring as follows: 
a. That a sale of the Center took place on or about the 
24th day of May, 1990 between the Appellees and IHC; and 
b. That the sale was a "sale" within the meaning of the 
provisions of paragraph 11 of the Termination Agreement 
between the parties and that Rehabilitation is entitled one-
third of any amounts attributable to good will. (R. 6-7) 
10. Appellees filed an Answer on or about October 30, 1991 
(R. 39) but subsequently, pursuant to Stipulation between the 
parties, filed an Amended Answer and Counterclaim. (R. 143-65) 
The Counterclaim was subsequently dismissed by stipulation of the 
parties, which stipulation included a provision requiring each 
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party to pay their own costs and attorney's fees incurred. (R. 
356-57 and 411-12) 
11. On or about June 15, 1993, the Appellees filed a Motion 
for Summary Judgment, seeking to dismiss Rehabilitation's claims on 
the basis that Rehabilitation could produce no evidence in support 
of its position that the transaction between the Appellees and IHC 
constituted a "sale" as that term is defined in the Termination 
Agreement. (R. 168-96) 
12. Rehabilitation filed a Counter Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment seeking a declaration that the transaction between the 
Appellees and IHC was in fact a "sale" as that term was defined in 
the Termination Agreement and that Rehabilitation was entitled to 
judgment against the Appellees in an amount to be proven at trial 
representing one-third of the purchase price attributable to the 
purchase of good will. (R. 199-225) Contemporaneously, 
Rehabilitation submitted the documents executed by the Appellees 
and IHC for in camera review pursuant to the Protective Order dated 
on or about August 17, 1992. (R. 226-28 and 464) 
13. The parties' Motions for Summary Judgment came on 
regularly for hearing on September 24, 1993. At the hearing, Judge 
Wilkinson indicated that his interpretation of the contract was 
different than either of the parties had argued. (R. 480-481) 
14. As a result of the court's inclination, counsel for the 
Appellees requested a continuance to submit additional legal 
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arguments, and the extra time was granted by the court. (R. 482-
83) 
15. After submission by the parties of the supplemental legal 
arguments, the matter came on for hearing once again on November 
15, 1993. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court completely 
reversed its position as set forth in the first hearing and stated, 
"Therefore I feel that the Motion by the Defendants is well taken. 
I would grant their Motion for Summary Judgment." (R. 495) The 
Order of Summary Judgment and Dismissal with Prejudice was entered 
on or about December 6, 1993. (R. 358-60) 
16. Rehabilitation filed a Motion for Reconsideration on 
November 29, 1993. (R. 351-353 and 361-396). 
17. The court agreed to reconsider its decision, and the 
matter came up for hearing on January 28, 1994. The court once 
again ruled in favor of the Appellees. (R. 504) The Order was 
entered on March 14, 1994. (R. 414) 
18. Rehabilitation filed its Notice of Appeal on or about 
April 11, 1994. (R. 417) (Again, this case has been fully briefed 
by the parties and is awaiting oral argument.) 
19. On or about April 19, 1994, the Appellees filed their 
Motion for Award of Attorney's Fees and Costs (R. 422-424), which 
Motion was supported by the Affidavit of Mark 0. Morris in Support 
of Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs (R. 425-444) wherein Mr. 
Morris was seeking a total of $15,322.55. 
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20. The Motion relied upon paragraph 14 of the Termination 
Agreement, and the Appellees' argument that Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-
56.5 (1992) provides for reciprocal rights to be reimbursed for 
attorney's fees and costs. (R. 423) 
21. Rehabilitation objected to the Motion arguing, among 
other things, that the plain language of paragraph 14 does not 
authorize such an award because neither party was in default or 
breach of the Termination Agreement and that Utah Code Ann. § 78-
27-56.5 (1992) simply does not apply to the facts of this case. 
(R. 446-450) 
22. The Motion came up regularly for hearing on November 18, 
1994. Thereafter, by Minute Entry dated November 21, 1994, the 
court granted the Appellees' Motion, but found that the fees 
requested were unreasonable. (R. 517) 
23. To facilitate entry of a final order and a notice of 
appeal on the issue of liability, the parties agreed that if the 
Appellees were in fact entitled to attorney's fees, the sum of 
$9,633.32 for attorney's fees and the sum of $782.55 for costs 
incurred through April 5, 1994, would be reasonable. (R. 519) 
24. The Order was entered by the court on January 23, 1995. 
(R. 519) 
25. Rehabilitation filed a timely Notice of Appeal on 
February 7, 1995. (R. 522) 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The Appellees are not entitled to an award of their 
attorney's fees and costs based upon the language in the contract. 
By granting the Appellees' Motion for Summary Judgment, the court 
found that neither party was in default or breach of the contract 
at issue. Because the contract provides only for fees should there 
be a default or breach and does not provide for an award of fees to 
a "prevailing party", the award must be reversed; and the motion 
dismissed with prejudice. 
2. The provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56.5 (1992) 
relating to reciprocal rights to recover attorney's fees do not 
apply to the facts of this case. Therefore, the award of fees and 
costs to Appellees must be reversed, and the motion dismissed with 
prejudice. 
ARGUMENT I 
THE APPELLEES ARE NOT ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF 
ATTORNEY'S FEES PURSUANT TO THE PLAIN AND 
UNAMBIGUOUS LANGUAGE OF THE TERMINATION 
AGREEMENT. 
The law in Utah is clear. "Attorney's fees are awardable 
[only] if authorized by statute or contract." (Karapanos v. Board 
Walk Fries, Inc. 837 P. 2d 576 (Utah App. 1992) .) Further, where a 
dispute involves the interpretation of a contract, the court must 
give effect to the parties' intentions as determined by looking at 
the terms of the written contract, (Hoth v. White 799 P. 2d 213 
(Utah App. 1990)), and a court must not rewrite a contract which 
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was negotiated between parties on the basis of equitable 
principles. Specifically, as this Court stated in Karapanos, 
supra., "It is not for a court to rewrite a contract improvidently 
entered into at arm's length or to change the bargain indirectly on 
the basis of supposed equitable principles." 837 P.2d at 578 
(citing Dalton v. Jerico Constr. Co. 642 P.2d 748, 750 (Utah 
1982) .) 
Applying these statements of the law to the facts of this 
case, the plain and unambiguous language of the Termination 
Agreement does not support an award of attorney's fees in favor of 
the Appellees. Pursuant to paragraph 14 of the Termination 
Agreement: 
14. Attorney's Fees. Should any party 
default in or breach any of the covenants or 
agreements contained herein, the defaulting or 
breaching party shall pay all costs and 
expenses, including reasonable attorney's 
fees, which may accrue from enforcing this 
agreement, or in pursuing any remedy provided 
hereunder, or by applicable law. 
(emphasis added and in original.) 
To begin with, when the Appellees were granted summary 
judgment, the court in essence found that they were not in default 
of and had not breached the Termination Agreement. The fact that 
they were the prevailing parties is irrelevant to the issue of 
attorney's fees. There is a case decided by the Utah Supreme Court 
which is directly on point. In Faulkner v. Farnsworth 714 P. 2d 
1149 (Utah 1986), the plaintiffs had brought an action for 
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declaratory judgment to compel the defendants to transfer title as 
purportedly required by the contract between them. The defendants 
prevailed, and the jury found that there was no default under the 
contract at issue. 
The language of the contract at issue in Faulkner relating to 
attorney's fees stated: 
The buyer and seller each agree that should 
they default in any of the covenants or 
agreements contained herein, that the 
defaulting party shall pay all costs and 
expenses, including a reasonable attorney's 
fee, which may arise or accrue from enforcing 
this agreement. 
Id . at 1150. (emphasis added) 
In reversing the lower court's award of attorney's fees to the 
plaintiff, the Utah Supreme Court held: 
The trial court found, based on the jury 
verdict, that defendants had not breached the 
provisions of the contract by refusing to 
convey title. That refusal was the only 
purported default at issue here. The 
contractual language does not award attorney 
fees to the prevailing party who succeeds in 
enforcing the agreement, but against the 
defaulting party whose default necessitates 
enforcement. As neither party was held in 
default, neither was entitled to attorney 
fees. 
Id. at 1151. (emphasis added) 
This language is directly applicable to the facts of this 
case. By granting summary judgment in favor of Appellees and 
dismissing Rehabilitation's Complaint for Declaratory Relief, the 
court determined that the Appellees were not in default and had not 
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breached the Termination Agreement. Because the language of 
paragraph 14 provides only for attorney's fees against a defaulting 
or breaching party, it cannot support an award of attorney's fees 
in this case to the prevailing party. (This result is especially 
compelling given the fact that it was the Appellees who drafted the 
subject contract. Therefore, by law, it must be construed against 
them. (See Sears v. Riemersma 655 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1982)).) 
Based upon the plain and unambiguous language of the 
Termination Agreement, it is clear that it does not support an 
award of attorney's fees in favor of the Appellees. The award must 
be reversed, and the Motion dismissed with prejudice. 
ARGUMENT II 
THE RECIPROCITY PROVISIONS OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 
78-27-56.5 (1992) DO NOT APPLY TO THE FACTS OF 
THIS CASE. 
In an effort to circumvent the plain and unambiguous language 
of the contract, the Appellees relied on the reciprocity provisions 
contained in Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56.5 to support their request 
for fees. Section 78-27-56.5 states: 
A court may award costs and attorney's fees to 
either party that prevails in a civil action 
based upon any promissory note, written 
contract, or other writing executed after 
April 28, 1986, when the provisions the 
promissory note, written contract, or other 
writing allow at least one party to recover 
attorney's fees. 
When interpreting the application of a statute, the court must 
first consider the plain and ordinary language used by the 
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legislature and look to extrinsic evidence only if there is an 
ambiguity. (See Hercules, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Commission 877 
P.2d 133 (Utah 1994).) Applying the plain language of § 78-27-
56.5, it is a condition precedent to its application that the 
contract at issue allow at least one party to recover attorney's 
fees. In this case, the contract at issue allows both parties to 
recover fees should the other party default in its obligations. 
Therefore, the contract already contains reciprocal rights, and the 
statute is not applicable. 
However, in the lower court, the Appellees argued that if 
Rehabilitation had prevailed, then the Appellees would have been 
required by the contract to pay attorney's fees and costs to 
Rehabilitation. Therefore, since Appellees prevailed, the language 
of § 78-27-56.5 applies to give them a reciprocal right to recover 
fees. This is a misapplication of the plain language of the 
statute, and it results in a one-sided and inappropriate 
modification of the written contract between the parties. Had 
Rehabilitation prevailed, it would have been as a result of the 
court finding that the Appellees had defaulted and/or breached the 
Termination Agreement. Therefore, Rehabilitation would have been 
entitled to fees under the language used by the parties in the 
Termination Agreement. Likewise, had the Defendants prevailed on 
their Counterclaims, then Rehabilitation would have been found in 
default or in breach of the Termination Agreement and the Appellees 
would have been entitled to attorney's fees. This is the result 
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mandated by the contract language, and it is a reciprocal right. 
It is a non-sensical interpretation to claim that the Appellees are 
entitled to attorney's fees despite the fact that there has been no 
default or breach simply because if Rehabilitation had prevailed, 
Rehabilitation would have been entitled to its fees. Neither the 
contract nor the statute support this result. 
Although the language of the statute is unambiguous and 
extrinsic evidence is not necessary to interpret it, the 
legislative history of § 78-27-56.5 supports the argument that the 
statute was not intended to apply as the Appellees argue. Attached 
hereto as Addendum "C" and by reference made a part hereof, is the 
entire legislative history of the bill. Although brief, it 
includes a description of the purpose of the bill: 
The purpose of the above proposed legislation 
is to put those who deal with the more 
sophisticated on more equal footing. Banks, 
corporations, etc., having their own legal 
staff and custom made forms which tend to use 
penalty language that does not cut both ways 
in the event of default and/or misconduct, 
[sic] 
It is clear from this language that the situation to which the 
statute applies is quite different from the current facts. In the 
case currently on appeal, the parties negotiated at arm's length, 
and neither was more sophisticated than the other. Because the 
parties were on equal footing and because the Termination Agreement 
does "cut both ways" in the event of default, it is clear that this 
statute does not apply. Therefore, the Order Granting Motion for 
20 
Award of Attorney's Fees must be reversed, and the Motion must be 
dismissed with prejudice. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court found that the Appellees were not in default 
of the Termination Agreement and entered summary judgment in their 
favor. Based upon the plain and unambiguous language contained in 
paragraph 14 of the Termination Agreement, the Appellees, as the 
prevailing party on summary judgment, are not entitled to an award 
of their attorney's fees absent a default or breach. Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-27-56.5 does not apply to change this result. Therefore, 
the Order Granting Motion for Award of Attorney's Fees dated 
January 23, 1995 must be reversed and the Appellees' Motion 
dismissed with prejudice. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2nd day of August, 1995. 
GREEN 8c LUHN, P.C. 
. t torneys/for Pla int i f f /Appel lant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 2nd day of August, 1995, I 
caused two true and correct copies of the foregoing to be [ ] 
mailed, postage prepaid via U.S. Mail, [ x ] hand delivered to: 
Mark 0. Morris, Esq. 
SNELL Sc WILMER 
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees 
111 East Broadway, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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ADDENDUM "A" 
FAULKNER v. 
Cite as 714 P^d 
word "child" to refer to an individual 
already born, with an existence separate 
from its mother. 
Burns, 420 U.S. 580, 581, 95 S.Ct. 1180, 
1184 (citations omitted). 
This interpretation is also consistent with 
our statutes on divorce, separation, and 
paternity. They all provide for the pay-
ment of child support by a father, but 
neither our case law nor our statutes sug-
gest that the duty to support the child 
arises before the child is born. Divorce 
commonly occurs while the wife is preg-
nant, but there is no statutory basis for 
awarding child support for an unborn child, 
separate and apart from support for the 
mother and the payment of her medical 
expenses. Under our statutes, a post-
humous child inherits from its father and 
mother, but that right cannot be exercised 
until there is a live birth. 
The legislature apparently was content 
to provide for the child in utero by award-
ing benefits to the surviving wife of the 
deceased worker who ordinarily would be 
carrying it. The wife's benefits commence 
at the date of her husband's death. In the 
instant case, we have the unusual situation 
where the worker's child in utero is carried 
by a woman not his legal wife and not 
herself entitled to benefits. In such cases, 
the legislature made no provision for the 
child in utero until it was born and then 
became a "posthumous child." 
The order of the Industrial Commission 
is directed to be modified so as to com-
mence benefits to Heather Ann Roach the 
day of her birth. 
HALL, C.J., and STEWART, DURHAM 
and ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur. 
714 P 2d—26 
FARNSWORTH Utah H 4 9 
1149 (Utah 1986) 
Nick FAULKNER and Karyl Faulkner, 
his wife, Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
v. 
F. Carl FARNSWORTH and Ann H. 
Farnsworth, his wife: and John Lee 
Torgerson and Mavis Torgerson, his 
wife, Defendants and Appellants. 
No. 19892. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Feb. 24, 1986. 
Purchasers brought action to compel 
specific performance of contract to pur-
chase real estate The Sixth District 
Court, Garfield County, Don V. Tibbs, J., 
granted purchasers' motion for summary 
judgment, and vendors appealed. The Su-
preme Court, 665 P.2d 1292, reversed and 
remanded. On remand, the District Court 
entered judgment on a jury verdict in favor 
of vendors, and awarded vendors attorney 
fees in the amount of $11,350. Purchasers 
appealed award of attorney fees. The Su-
preme Court held that award of attorney 
fees pursuant to provision of real estate 
sales contract providing for such an award 
against a defaulting party was improper, 
where neither party in action for declarato-
ry judgment to compel vendors to transfer 
title were found in default. 
Award set aside; remanded. 
1. Appeal and Error <3=842(8) 
Interpretation of contract language 
presents Supreme Court with a question of 
law on which it need not defer to trial 
court's construction; rather, Court is free 
to render its independent interpretation. 
2. Costs <s=>172 
Award of attorney fees pursuant to 
provision of real estate sales contract pro-
viding for such an award against a default-
ing party was improper, where neither par-
ty in action for declaratory judgment to 
compel vendors to transfer title were found 
in default. 
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John H. McDonald, Salt Lake City, for 
defendants and appellants. 
Robert F. Orton, Salt Lake City, for 
plaintiffs and respondents. 
PER CURIAM: 
Plaintiffs Faulkner appeal from that part 
of the judgment on a jury verdict awarding 
defendants Farnsworth and Torgerson at-
torney fees in the amount of $11,350 and 
costs in the amount of $507.89, together 
with interest from the date of judgment at 
the rate of 12 percent per annum. We 
reverse. 
This case is before us for the second 
time. Plaintiffs sued for declaratory judg-
ment to compel defendants to transfer title 
as purportedly required by contract be-
tween plaintiffs and defendants. The trial 
court granted their motion for summary 
judgment, and defendants appealed. We 
remanded the case to the trial court for a 
trial on the merits because of an ambiguity 
in the contract. Faulkner v. Farnsworth, 
Utah, 665 P.2d 1292 (1983). The question 
to be decided upon remand was whether 
defendants were to discharge an obligation 
under the "Pope" contract (the contract 
between defendants as buyers and Pope as 
seller of the real estate later sold to plain-
tiffs) or whether defendants as sellers in 
their contract with plaintiffs were to con-
vey title to plaintiffs when the sums owing 
by plaintiffs equaled the amount of defend-
ants' underlying obligation on the "Pope" 
contract. A jury returned a verdict in fa-
vor of defendants, finding that the "Pope" 
contract was not assumable by plaintiffs. 
The court then awarded attorney fees to 
defendants under paragraph 21 of the con-
tract, which reads as follows: 
The buyer and seller each agree that 
should they default in any of the cove-
nants or agreements contained herein, 
that [sic] the defaulting party shall pay 
all costs and expenses, including a rea-
sonable attorney's fee, which may arise 
or accrue from enforcing this agreement. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Plaintiffs contend that the trial court 
erred as a matter of law in ordering them 
to bear the legal costs of the prevailing 
party, when the contract predicated the 
award of attorney fees on a default in the 
covenants or agreements and imposed 
those fees expressly on the defaulting par-
ty. 
[1] The interpretation of contract lan-
guage presents us with a question of law 
on which we need not defer to the trial 
court's construction but are free to render 
our independent interpretation. Jones v. 
Hinkle, Utah, 611 P.2d 733 (1980). Under 
Utah law, attorney fees may be recovered 
if provided by contract or statute. "If by 
contract, the award of attorney's fees is 
allowed" only in accordance with the terms 
of the contract" Turtle Management, 
Inc. v. Haggis Management, Inc., Utah, 
645 P.2d 667 (1982); accord Trayner v. 
Gushing, Utah, 688 P.2d 856 (1984). De-
fendants support their argument that the 
award of attorney fees was proper with 
cases decided under identical or similar con-
tract language. Swain v. Salt Lake Real 
Estate & Investment Co., 3 Utah 2d 121, 
279 P.2d 709 (1955), overruled on other 
grounds, Management Services Corp. v. 
Development Associates, Utah, 617 P.2d 
406 (1980); Management Services Corp., 
supra; Jones, supra. All of those cases 
involved a default by one party or the 
other, so that an award of attorney fees 
was proper in light of the contractual lan-
guage. 
[2] Here, by comparison, there was no 
default. Plaintiffs had reduced their pay-
ments to an amount equal to the underly-
ing obligation of defendants. They were 
current in their payments. Plaintiffs be-
lieved defendants were in default in not 
conveying title, but a jury found otherwise. 
An award of attorney fees is improper 
when it is not based on the terms contained 
in the parties' agreement or where the 
breach is not based on contract Trayner, 
supra; L & M Corp. v. Loader, Utah, 688 
P.2d 448 (1984). In Turtle Management, 
Inc., supra, an agreement for the sale of 
assets provided that the cost of enforcing 
the agreement, including a reasonable at-
UTAH STATE TAX 
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torney fee, should be borne by the party in 
default We there upheld the proper rul-
ing by the trial court that only one party 
was in default, and attorney fees were 
limited accordingly against that one party. 
Other jurisdictions have held the award of 
attorney fees improper in disputes dealing 
with the declaration of rights and obli-
gations under contract, where the contrac-
tual language restricted the award to cur-
ing default or breach or to enforcing the 
payment of rent or other provisions of a 
lease. Siltzer v. North First Bank, Fla. 
App., 445 So.2d 649 (1984) (mortgage and 
note); Ocala Warehouse Investments, Ltd. 
v. Bison Co., Fla.App., 416 So.2d 1269 
(1982) (lease); Chesterfield Co. v. Ritzen-
heim, Fla.App., 350 So.2d 15 (1977) (lease); 
Hindquarter Corp. v. Property Develop-
ment Corp., 95 Wash.2d 809, 631 P.2d 923 
(1981) (lease renewal). 
The trial court found, based on the jury 
verdict, that defendants had not breached 
the provisions of the contract by refusing 
to convey title. That refusal was the only 
purported default at issue here. The con-
tractual language does not award attorney 
fees to the prevailing party who succeeds 
in enforcing the agreement, but against the 
defaulting party whose default necessitates 
enforcement. As neither party was held in 
default, neither was entitled to attorney 
fees. 
The award of attorney fees is set aside. 
The award of costs was proper under sec-
tion 78-33-10 of the Declaratory Judgment 
Act and is therefore affirmed. The case is 
remanded for entry of judgment consistent 
with this opinion. 
COM'N v. EREKSON Utah 1151 
1151 (Utah 1986) 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Gene M. EREKSON, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 19939. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Feb. 25, 1986. 
The Fourth District Court, Utah Coun-
ty, George E. Baliff, J., found party in 
contempt, and he appealed. The Supreme 
Court, held that minute entry, unsigned by 
court and not susceptible of enforcement, 
did not constitute final appealable order 
and thus appeal was without jurisdiction. 
Appeal dismissed. 
Contempt <3=>66(2) 
Minute entry, unsigned by court and 
not susceptible of enforcement, did not con-
stitute final, appealable order and thus ap-
peal of party found in contempt by trial 
court was without jurisdiction. 
Gene M. Erekson, pro se. 
David L. Wilkinson, Atty. Gen., James L. 
Barker, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, 
for plaintiff and respondent. 
PER CURIAM: 
Plaintiff Utah State Tax Commission pe-
titioned the district court below to enforce 
a Tax Commission subpoena served on de-
fendant for the production of his books and 
records for the tax years 1979 through 
1982. Defendant appeals the trial court's 
finding of contempt and sentence. We dis-
miss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction be-
cause of the complete absence of any final, 
appealable order from the trial court. Pate 
v. Marathon Steel Co,, Utah, 692 P.2d 765 
(1984). 
The district court's order to show cause 
why defendant should not be held in con-
tempt was heard in October 1983, and the 
ADDENDUM "B" 
TERMINATION AGREEMENT 
AND 
PURCHASE AGREEMENT 
A. j r^ement d ~ t e d t h i s _ £ _ " day ° ^ fly**1 , 
1 .•**&, b e t w e e n S a l t Lako Ivaee and S p o r t s R e h a b i l i t a t i o n , I n c . 
Cliirts.ii-.af t « r v s f e i : i : ed t:> a s ,f R e h a b i l i t a t i o n " ) , And S&IL Lak<s 
C i t y Knev a S p o r t s M e d i c i n e ( h e r e i n a f t e r r e f e r r e d t o a s 
• • p n y f i i c i d n s " ) . 
WIIEKTAK S^l t L'-tkfc S p o r t s M e d i c i n e C e n t e r 
v h ^ r a i n a f t e i : r e f e r r e d t o a s ' ' M e d i c i n e " ) a n d R e h a b i l i t a t i o n ' 
( i n h e r e d i n t o a ? r o f » T S I "mal S e r v i c e s C o n t r a c t m d L e a s e 
A g r e e m e n t dci ted C e ^ l e i t?er 21, 1987 ( h e r e i n a f t e r r e f e r r e d t o 
a s t h e * ^ rn^n t ' 1 ) ; ant] 
MT
*fcT:A3 Med c i n e <;ave t o R e h a b i l i t a c i o n a N o t i c e * 
zi \ n e r r \ d a t ^ d J a n - A v y 1 9 , 1989 p u r s u a n t t o t h e t e r m s 
. t h ^ hqi utimLirtt; and 
WHEREAS I h y s i c m n s u3 t h e s u c c e s s o r i n i n t e r e s t t o 
x
' i J . i • - ; a n d 
WHEREAS P^lu»r«i 1 i t At ion d e s i r e s t o s e l l t o 
P h y s i c i a n s and ? h v ^ i ~ -inn d e s i r e t o p u r c h a s e f rom 
R e h a b i l i t a t i o n ^ i ^ u n ^ i h ^ T . e n r . owr , by R e h a b i l i t a t i o n and 
c u r r e n t l y i d e a t e d ^ t h e o f f i c e of R e h a b i l i t a t i o n a t ' 6 7 0 . , 
CasL 11900 S o u t h , ^ n l t I ^A^
 v i t y , U t a h ? 
Now, Uu* i^ f , : ^ , i!» c o n s i d e r a t i o n of t h e m u t u a l 
c o v e n a n t . * s a t f o r t h o - - ^ / , , l ^ s i ^ i r c i e s h e r e t o a g r e e a s 
f o l l o w s : 
A 
1 • TerminajLiwiu Tne Agreement i s hereby 
f2rni:idt>rd e£fcf>cti</e A p r i l 1 9 . 1 9 0 9 , s u b j e c t to the 
prcvi^ioMR of paragraph 13 of chat Agreement, which- by i t s . 
terras s u r v i v e s t h e t e r m i n a t i o n of the Agreement. 
?.• V a c a t i o n of Premise s . R e h a b i l i t a t i o n shall* 
-j;iCii\'e t h e p r e m i s e s at. 0 70 E a s t 3 900 South , S a l t Lake C i t y , 
Utah, (ht ir t-s inaftet r e f e r r e d to a s t h e "Leased Premises 1 1 ) . / 
which i s t h e s u b j e c t oi: t . ie Agreement, no l a t e r than Sunday 
Apri l 2 j , J9d9 a t 12:00 M i d n i g h t . 
3. Pel e a s e of CL^iii ' i , The p a r t i e s hereto hereby 
i p l e a s e eai:h o t h e r anu th t f i r p r e d e c e s s o r s in i n t e r e s t and' \ 
p r i n c i p a l s for a l l cl-Aims' iri-i l i a b i l i t y to each o ther - -./ 
ft 
a r i i i r . g ou: e£ t h e Ayrw^^en1! '*r t h e p a r t i e s ' performance'"/^ 
c ;u : r ?unae r , fixcey- ^c r any c la ims a r i s i n g oat of paragraph v 
11 ir.d p a r a g r a p h 1") of t h e Agroemsnt , which c la ims are -'-;';'-jr 
s p « c i L i s a l l y res.e:v«»d bv L'-.e p a r t i e s . '?.':.* 
4, sa"1"? of £.qvi pise-nt. R a n a b i l i t a t i o n hereby'%£&' 
s e l l s to Fhy3lci?n«s ar.d P . i ya i c i ana hereby purchase £rom..&4& 
- - - *» - A««*% 
R^h*:,ij i t ^ i i c n 4ihat equipment owned by R e h a b i l i t a t i o n an&&$ 
cu r r»n t . l y l o c a t e d s t thv "Leased p r e m i s e s " which i s setJ^j&Jj f o r t h in E x h i b i t J. a t t a c h e d h e r e t o and incorporated h e r e i n 
by r e f e r e n c e ( h e r e i n a f t e r r e f e r r e d t c as the M Equipment ^ . v V 
5, P u r c h a s e P r i c e , The purchase p r i c e for tne3S2 
Lquipjn^fit . shdl l &*o T h i r t y - T h r e e Thousand Nine Hundred and*®? 
t ' X ^ ! TW^nr.y-Ninr D o l l a r IS2? , 1 2 9 . 0 0 ) and s h a l l be paid to.yv «£?/r: 
r*J7., . ^ r 
-3-
R e h a b i l i t a t i o n by Phynioian* in cash at the time of Clos ing , 
sub j ec t to che p rov i s ion ft of paragraph 7 below. ,(-. 
6. ™m^S±.S,9J^_J^9Jir££±±?^ with Granite" ^ 
S c h o o l ^ ? j g i c t J ^ .Medicine Program. In ... 
add i t ion uo the p u r e e s * p r i c e for t h e Equipment, Phys ic ians 
s h a l l pay to R e h a b i l i t a t i o n a t C los ing , sub j ec t to the 
p rov i s ions of paragraph 7 below, the sun, of Six Thousand, / . . 
Dol la rs ( 3 6 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 ) , which r e p r e s e n t s reimbursement to . ' 
r e h a b i l i t a t i o n for cos t s incurred by R e h a b i l i t a t i o n in - • 
connection with R e h a b i l i t a t i o n ' s p a r t i c i p a t i o n In Medic ine ' s 
Gran i te School D i s t r i c t Hiub School Spor t s Medicine Program. 
7. Liens ?nd.J^c^aibrance_s. I t is understood by 
the p a r t i e s t ha t the ^ u i p r . e n t is encumbered by a s e c u r i t y 
i n t e r e s t held by west One Bank (as successor in i n t e r e s t ' o f . 
Tracy CoU.r.s, Bank and Trus t Company) to secure p a y m e n t ^ a 
c u r r e n t balance owing or Forty-One Thousand Three Hundred.; -
L'iuhty-Cne and 37/100 d o l l a r s ( 241 ,381 .37 ) . 1^ add i t ion , - i t 
is understood -.hat the Equipment, a s well as c e r t a i n - •-^ 
equipment p r ev ious ly sold by R e h a b i l i t a t i o n to ? h y s i c i a t ^ £ . 
( i n ' app rox ima te ly Ssp'-emcsjt of 1967 J is encumbared ^ * ^ - t 
s«curj«-v ln-»r»*t .held by Cap i t a l C i t y Bank (as successor , in 
i n t e r e s t of Union Sank). ^ h a b i l i t a t i o n sha l l insure . t ha | ; y . 
chose ei.cumbrav.c-* *re c lea red and r e l ea sed in c o n n e c t i o n ^ , 
with tho purchdse b l u n d e r . In t h a t r ega rd , i t i s ./.' 
un-l-irstood U-Mt a t Closv.ii the payments to be made t o -
— h — 
F a h a b i l i t a t i o n shal l ba pair; j o i n t l y to R e h a b i l i t a t i o n and i' 
Wo a i. One Bciik. Ret.abi.li tar. ion s h a l l then use tho,se funds-. ' 
ton - r w i t h su-.'h or i t s own funds as necessa ry to 
"in. i t e l / pay off the amcu'it owing to West One Bank and 
P • and have m - d a t e r m i n a t i o n of West One's s e c u r i t y 
, 4 <
'
a i n s t th
''-- Eqaipip»at. I t i s a n t i c i p a t e d t h a t t he 
w i l l toge ther pvoc-^d d i r e c t l y from the Leased ":'.,' 
•7'•'*-, 
>s to the wusi. One Bank on the day of c lo s ing t o make" 
c«=:rain c l:al the d'jovo- i n s c r i b e d procedure i s a c c o m p l i s h e d ^ 
8. Clcs ing , c los ing s h a l l occur a t t h e Leased^?" „ 
- -omicro a-, -x ti:rc muMmlly ag reeab le to the p u r t i c o , bu t ' in 
ic -ven t l a t e r than Fr iday, May 5, 1989 a t 5:00 p.m. Atijp 
c l o b i n ^ , P V r u i a n s or th*M r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s h a l l t ake a ; ;V* 
pl'iSAcal inventory o£ thp Equipment. At c l o s i n q . v'^T 
*. ***&. 
R s h d o i l u t a t i o i , s h i i l provide to Phys ic i ans w r i t t e n - ''I£$\> 
v e r . f i c a L j o n from Capi ta l Ci ty Bank (as successor i n ' „ " )%£ •' 
unters-at to n r n on Bank) t h a t any l i e n s or s e c u r i t y i n t e r e s t s 
. {f ?$*-
that e n t i t y nsy have against- che Equipment and aga in s t - anyjL • 
j • f? * s . * • 
*quip.-,ient Phyfiu:1 J R C o l J r - p a r t n e r s may havo p r e v i o u s l y ? ! ^ 
-
u , u
*
J w e e d L
*
rom
 R«hrtoil 1 c a t i o n ( inc lud ing wi thout l i n i i t a t l S S S 
r4;c pnya i ca l thuxany equipment l oca t ed a t 3 59 8th Avenuel^SE 
wmch vas iJurt!.as<?d in approximate ly September of 19 B 7 f'have*' 
' AV/ < 
been L ^ m i n a t ^ d . i^on v e r i f i c a t i o n of the -presence 'of *each**! 
u e r OL
 Equipment, -tnd upon r e c e i p t of the v e r i f i c a t i o n . ^ ^ ; " ; . 
JJ u «w .-,;,-.-^ - cn^ii deliver to Rehabilitatioiv-'.'a, required above, physic tan* ^naxi. uexxvu^ uw •• :***••. 
Chech ma«l« payable to Rehabilitation and West Oneiric f o r ^ 
the entire purchase pri-e of t:he Equipment together.with the 
payment referred to in paragraph 6 above. 
9. Warranties. Rehabilitation warrants that it^i 
owns the Equipment, free from any liens or encumbrances^;^.-
except those referred tr> in paragraph 7 above, and has
 ?the •£ 
right to sell the sar.;e. Rehabilitation further warrants;^ 
chat all of the Equipment shall at the time of Closing be/in 
good working ccndi<: ion an6 free from defects. 
10. Coin Tosfi Regarding Murray High School, 
Physicians and RehabilitatJon. acknowledge that pursuant to
 : 
paragraph 13 of the Ayi:eein*nt, the right to be involved in _e 
Sports Kedioins preuram at high schools which became a par£ 
of Medicine's Hiah School "ports Medicine Prograia after, thg 
effective dare of the Agreement would be determined by^ai**^ 
/•:•••: -i •??$&$ 
tons of the com. The uafties agree that Murray HighSchoo: 
••- ' '"'"'•Jr^l 
fits into tha» category, :ind the parties therefore agree?Q| 
that at Closing a coin toss shall be conducted between : ^ & 
Physicians and "suabiUtation, with the winner of that^oiig 
tcss having the sole right !:o conduct a Sports MedicinaV^ 
Program at Murray High School, free from competition from^ 
the loser of that co' ">33* 
U . Purchase of center. It is agreed that,,if.^g| 
within two (:;) •••PBCS from the dats of this Agreei<\«iiL,.:v.^ '^ ;i 
-6-
Physiciana sells the Center to any third party, 
Rehabilitation shall b* entitled to one-third (1/3). of':that 
»/• 
•••y.;W« portion of the purchase price which is attributed to good§ 
will , "Sale" shall be defined as a transfer wherein the-® 
/^~\ • • -^ f^  
purchaser acquires and pays consideration fo /al l 1 of theHS 
following; The Center '3 lease on the Leased Premises,"!?!^ 
ownership of the name "Sale Lake Sports Medicine Center^S 
^11) of the equipment and ether assets located at thVcentSxfS 
the Center's patients and accounts receivable, and wherebyj 
the purchaser assumes complete operational control of the% 
ousmess of the Center and continues operating under theW 
"'. . •&$§& 
same name at the same location. ''~t$t& 
12
« Binding Agreement. This Agreement shall bel 
binding on and inure to tt-e benefit of the parties, andC 
their heirs, succsssofs, and assigns. •• V ^ 
13- Tims. Time is of the essence of this ^ ^ - ^ 
Agreement. 
14. Attorneys Fe<js, Should any party defauliSJnl 
or breach any of the covenants or agreements contained^*!!* 
herein, the defaulting or breaching party shall pay'falu|S 
coats and expenses, including reasonable attorneys"'*feeS 
- 7 -
wi 7->3S» h i c h may a c c r u e f rom e n f o r c i n g t h i s A g r e e m e n t , o r in 'v . .££f^ 
p u r s u i n g a n y remedy p r o v i d e d h e r e u n d e r , or by a p p l i c a b l e . ^ ; 
l a w . 
SALT LAKE KNEE & SPORTS 
REHABILITATION, INC. : '.' 
By L 
I t s ~Z3£Z U ^r 
SALT LAKE CITY KNEE & SPORTS.'j 
MEDICINE, a U t a h Par tnerah ' ip^ 
By LONNIE E. PAULOS, M.D.'^Inei^ 
a P r o f e s s i o n a l C o ^ o r a t i r o n ^ l ^ ' 
G e n e r a l P a r ^ C n ^ r / ^ / /• )^Mh 
By f \ £ - / ' /'/Zi,<<^1 ••"•:^%& 
•Lon-h id-7Z / Paul o s , pTe"s"To^ 
By ^ M A S D. ROSENBERG, M.D*, ?;£>§]•£ 
a P ro fe s s iona l C o r p o r a t i o n / i ' ; ; J ^ ? ^ i 
General Par tner ' ****.-»>.« 
Thcmas D. "Rosenberg, M 
Exhibit "A* 
1YSICAL THERAPY EQUIPMENT 
300 SOUTH CLINIC 
PURCHASE 
JCIPMENT AT 70* PRICE 
L£G CURL 1.217.00 
SMITH MACHINE (SQUAT; 1,145.00 
CROSSOVER (PULLEY SYSTEM) 1,392.00 
COMPOTfiROW 1,299.00 
LEG PRESS 1,550.CO 
TOTAL HIP 1,411.00 
82TTLER ULTRASOUND 907.00 
MULTIPLEX STIMULATOR 1,677.00 
SCOTSMA:: ICE HACHIHE I.O9?.OO 
FITROW CYCLE 907.00 
MEDMETRIC KT-1000 2,038.00 
EXAK TABLES (6 9 $250 EA.) 1,050.00 
CHATTANOGA XNTELECT STIM 1,330.00 
KYDROCOLLATOR HOT PACK 630.00 
WHIRLPOOL 805.00 
MIXING VALVE 263.00 
CAST CUTTERS 161.00 
ITAL: 18,374.00 
UIPMENT £ 30* 
LEG EXTENSION 521.00 
SEATED CHEST PRESS 794.00 
PULL0V2R 894.00 
AS CRUNCH 405.00 
KIN COM S,646.00 
SANI GRINDER 101.00 
SANDDUNS 105.00 
~V . 11,4.66.00 
FICE EQUIPMENT § 70* 
IS07SC, PHONES (4 § 270) 756.00 
I2M WHEELWRITER 490.00 
A.MANO TIME CLOCK 210,00 
TYPEWRITER STAND 32.00 
FILE CABINETS (2 $ 480} 672.00 
yOOT STOOL 25.00 
WAITING RCOM SOFA (1/2) 229.00 
LUNCHROOM TABLE 56.00 
LUNCHROOM CHAIRS <• 4 28.00 
MICROWAVE 70.00 
CHAIRS (3 % 3.54} 462.00 
DESK 559.00 
3,589.00 
ADDENDUM " C 
r
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D Yes 
Committee 
QNo 
Office No. 
Attorney. 
Versions . 
jurr-m^"*1^ 
Operator/date /VUS/K J (f.'ZO 
, ' , ? ; * ' 
Proofer/date » ^ 
I >•#&?; From the desk of 
Representative RicJIardX. i & » ~ f t ^ 
Utah State Legislature 
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RECIPROCAL RIGHT TO RECOVER ATTORNEY' 
1 9 8 $ ... , ..^i^-»/«k<i-»ViBS««f^&>->-
•' '; ..."•,Ut>;w.:-•i;'.-*«f»«3i^«i«ft'-:-
GENERAL S B S S I O H • • - - - . . ^ ^ r ^ ^ ; - -
E n t O U e d C
°
Py
 By Richard L. H«f 1.U . .Sggg*• ; 
H
-
 B
'
 H 0 # 1 ? 5
 „ . miiRT TO AWARD ATTORNEY'S. ^*.' 
P B E S TO THE PUVAILINC ^ » » * * I 0 » , , , , , , 
COHTEAC. OR OIUER " » " I » 0 . ^ , I / V U S . ^ " 
ENACTS* 
7 8 - 2 J - 5 6 . 5 , UTAH CODE AHHOTATEO » » . ;^jffigg 
it enacted ay cne u«a .. -.,
 - n a c t e d i i W 2 ^ 
• 78-27-56.5, Utah Code Annotated 195?, M ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ | 
Section 1. Section 78-27 3t».a» . . . - - • , . • v ; - - ; L ; - ^ ^ : ^ ^ p g j ^ ^ 
,;-v'i.>V^ 
'•*V.-
-v-v^: . 
• •• . . « •. ; i r . — . • 
read: 
1 
2 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
I^GISI^TIVB" GEWBEAE'COUVSKI,'^?! , 
Approved for Piling JLF -v-i-y^:^-:-: 
H. B. Mo. 175 
Date 01-09-86 1:29 PM 
(RECIPROCAL RIGHT TO RECOVER ATTORNEY'S PEES) 
1986 
GENERAL SESSION r^^^^':?:^^} 
By Richard L> Maxfield 
^'M^»t-<->*-^-< .^.^ _ 
AM ACT RELATING TO THE JUDICIAL CODE; ALLOWING A COURT TO AWARD ATTORNEY'S 
FEES TO THE PREVAILING PARTY IN AN ACTION OM A PROMISSORY NOTE, 
CONTRACT, OR OTHER WRITING, 
THIS ACT AFFECTS SECTIONS OF UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953 AS FOLLOWS: 
ENACTS: 
78-27-56.5, UTAH CODP ANNOTATED 1953 
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the state of Utah: 
• ••'•:-<-• ••^h.r-^v"**lv.-,*-* -
Section 1. Section 78-27-56.5, Utah Code Annotated 1953, ..la enactedvtp^^^|^|^ 
read: 
78-27-56.5. A court may award costs and attorney V—iEeea'^ 
party that prevails in a civil action based upon any promissory note. 
contract, or other writing executed after April ~28« 1986»* when** the 
provisions of the promissory note, contracty or other writing allow at • 
least one party to recover attorney 
RECIPROCAL RIGHT TO .RECOVER ATTORNEY FEES 
In a civil action where a promissory note, contract, or 
other writing permits one of the parties but not the other to 
recover attorney fees, the right to recover legal expenses shall 
be reciprocal and an award may be xaade in favor of either party 
in connection with any prevailing claim, defense, and/or 
counterclaim. 
PAUL M. TINKER 
OEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 
DALUN * . JENSEN 
SoKNorOemaf 
WILLIAM T. EVANS Cmmr 
OONALO S. COLEMAN. C w v 
.THE ATTORN 
-STATE OF 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
ATTOATCV OENCMAl 
March 7, 1986 
STEfntEN*a8Cm^\Q|MAKCHU« 5 5 & 
v. ^A.^fAUL* ttMKER. Cuter - ^ 
Honorable Norman H. Bangerter 
Governor, State of Utah 
210 State Capitol 
Sa l t Lake City, DT 84114 
BUILDING MAIL 
Dear Governor Bangerter: 
Pursuant t o your request, I have reviewed H*B* No* 175 f %^^^^/ 
RECIPROCAL RIGHT TO RECOVER ATTORNEY'S FEES. ^ - " < > • y ^ w ^ ^ v i ? ^ 
I t i s my opinion that the b i l l does not pcesc ^ 
patent const i tut ional problem or obvious l e g a l def ic iency 
Very.truly yours. 
'$*»»• , ' i r W I M 
STEPHEN J.Vv«6RENS0N -a 
Ass is tant AttorneyiGeneri 
L i t i g a t i o * Divis i 
SJStbab 
'
s
'V*?&&j$i$t£i*:^ • '••• 
Joint Rule 23.16 requires the Legislative General Counsejorhis designee to review and approve all! _ 
with the approval of the sponsor, to make those changes necessary tot (a) insure that it Is in proper lei 
remove any ambiguities; and (c) avoid constitutional or statutory conflicts." - ^ ^ C ^ p & S ^ f f l 8 8 
The Legislative Generd! Counsel or his designee has"ieviewed and approvedi this legijiatlon/Tho ToUoTliiSJ 
information outlines the considerations on which the approval was given. • .'I.Z* $$%&&****"* 
u D l. The bill contains a "single subject" which Is clearly expressed In the ••^^$\i^i^^ 
yes no title as required bv the Utah Constitution, Article VI, Sec. 22. f- ^'S^^^C 
L3 U 2. The bill meets all the form requirements prescribed by lejgislattvtt iM^^'^!feS3?53^/ 
yes
 M - - . v7 .^v ,Wi^ f e * 
D 
no 
conflicts 
S. The bill does not have state or federal constitutional conflicts. ^.^-.^^^ 
(Judgments regarding constitutionality address only obvious constitutional ^  
problems and do not represent a detailed review of all issues,}.-}-&%&•- " 
possible 
conflicts 
Explanation 
4. The foUowing information suixuna^ 
on governmental agencies and existing statutes and easel ^ 
